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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Tyson Lee Buss appeals from the District Court's order summarily dismissing his 
petition for post-conviction relief. Mr. Buss asserts that, because he voluntarily 
dismissed his June 2005 petition for post-conviction relief, and that petition was 
dismissed without prejudice, the district erred in dismissing his December 2005 petition 
based upon a finding that Mr. Buss had knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived 
the claims raised in the June 2005 petition. He further asserts that the district court 
erred in dismissing the December 2005 petition based upon the application of the 
doctrine of issue preclusion because the district court failed to follow the procedures 
mandated by I.C. § 19-4906(b) when it sua sponte dismissed on those grounds, and 
when it relied upon erroneous legal and factual findings in concluding that the doctrine 
applied. Finally, Mr. Buss asserts that the district court erred in dismissing his claim that 
his guilty plea was not knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily entered because it was 
based upon the ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court erred in dismissing 
this claim because the court failed to follow the procedures mandated by I.C. 3 19- 
4906(b) when it sua sponte dismissed the claim for lack of evidence of prejudice. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedinas 
On December 22, 2003, Tyson Lee Buss entered an Alford Plea, North Carolina 
v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), to the charge of voluntary manslaughter with a sentencing 
enhancement for the use of a deadly weapon. (Ch.Plea Tr., p.4, Ls.17-20.) During that 
hearing, the State submitted a statement of the facts supporting the plea. 
It was about 9:30 on May 25'h, 2003, when Dwight Thompson, who 
was the victim in this matter, was in a car with two other individuals. They 
were driving on Boulevard Street at this hour when they saw the 
defendant with another individual. The victim recognized the defendant, 
and he pulled his car up to an alley on Boulevard Street in Idaho Falls, 
and 7th Street, got out of his car and approached the defendant. 
And the victim in this matter believed that the defendant owed 
some money, so he approached the defendant and began to inquire about 
the money. An argument ensued. The victim raised his voice, and there 
were some statements made to the effect of, pay me the money or you'll 
have to shoot me. You'll have to shoot me. 
The defendant had a High Point 9mm semiautomatic gun. The 
argument lasted a very brief duration, at which time the defendant raised 
the firearm and it discharged. The bullet penetrated Mr. Thompson's skin 
in the mid-abdomen area. 
EMTs arrived at the scene and began to administer some lifesaving 
procedures upon Mr. Thompson. He was transported to the hospital 
where he was pronounced a short time thereafter dead. There was an 
autopsy that was ordered and conducted and the bullet retrieved from Mr. 
Thompson. 
The defendant, after shooting Mr. Thompson, ran and was 
apprehended by law enforcement a short distance from this incident. And 
a short time after, he was interviewed by law enforcement, where he 
acknowledged having the gun. He acknowledged shooting the gun and 
told law enforcement how he came into possession of the gun. 
This crime was observed by three neighbors that witnessed the 
entire event, would testify to the nature of the argument that was 
transpiring. It was also witnessed by a driver that was passing by at the 
very moment this occurred, and it was also witnessed by two of the 
occupants that were with the victim. And all of those individuals would 
have testified as to those facts, and we would have had the death 
established through medical testimony. 
It did happen in Bonneville County, Your Honor. 
Thereafter: 
Buss was sentenced on February 9, 2004. The district court 
imposed a total sentence of thirty years, with sixteen years fixed. 
On June 20, 2005, Buss filed a petition for post conviction relief 
commencing Bonneville County case no. CV-05-3532. The State filed a 
motion for summary dismissal in case no. CV-05-3532 on August 16, 
2005. and a hearing was held on that motion on October 27, 2005. At the 
October 27, 2005, hearing, Buss requested that he be allowed to withdraw 
his petition for post conviction relief. The court considered Buss's request 
to be a motion to dismiss and granted the motion. 
(R.,p.28.) More specifically, at the October 27, 2005 hearing in Bonneville County case 
no. CV-05-3532, counsel for Mr. Buss informed the district court that, 
I did have a chance to speak with Mr. Buss, I did discuss his petition and 
the fact that many of the allegations he's alleged have to do with what 
Mr. Allison said or didn't do, and with his recent passing it would be hard 
to prove any of those allegations. He has asked me, first of all, to 
withdraw his petition so he might reconsider and decide if he wants to file 
it again under new issues or just try a different tack. But in the alternative, 
if the court is not willing to do that, I'd just like to address some of his 
allegations. 
(Exhibit, Audio recording of October 27, 2005 (hereinafter, A.R.).) Counsel then 
addressed the merits of some of Mr. Buss's claims. (A.R.) The state objected to 
Mr. Buss's motion to withdraw the petition, and specifically asked the district court to 
instead summarily dismiss the petition. (A.R.) The district court ultimately dismissed 
the petition pursuant to ldaho Rule of Civil Procedure 41, stating: 
Rule 41 of the ldaho Rules of Civil Procedure talks about voluntary 
dismissal. 41(a)(l) indicates subject to the provisions of Rule 23 and 73, 
which aren't applicable here, an action may be dismissed by the plaintiff 
without order of the court by filing a notice or by stipulation, otherwise, 
which is paragraph 2, it indicates except as provided in paragraph one of 
this subdivision of this rule, and action shall be dismissed at the plaintiffs 
instance ... shall not be dismissed save upon order of the court and upon 
such terms and conditions as it deems proper. No counter-claims have 
been pleaded and there hasn't been in this case so I don't have to deal 
with that. So basically it gives me the opportunity to decide whether to 
accept or reject the motion for dismissal. Mr. Mallard I consider your first 
request, I think you said you wanted to withdraw the petition was the 
language you used. I think that's equivalent to a motion to dismiss the 
petition. The motion's granted. The petition is dismissed. 
(A.R.) 
In addition to filing a post-conviction action, Mr. Buss appealed his conviction, 
and the remittitur in that appeal issued on December 28,2004.' 
On December 12, 2005, the district court received a Petition and Affidavit for 
Post-Conviction Relief. (See R., p.3.) In that Petition, Mr. Buss asserted, in part, that 
he received ineffective assistance of counsel and was coerced into a guilty plea when, 
prior to the entry of Mr. Buss's guilty plea, Mr. Buss's attorney informed him that, "there 
was no self defense or justification homicide in Idaho" and that Mr. Buss would be found 
guilty "Because there is no self defense." (R., p.5.) Mr. Buss also asserted that he was 
factually innocent of the crime. (R., p.9.) As a remedy for these claims, Mr. Buss 
sought to withdraw his guilty plea. (R., p.6.) 
The State filed an answer in which it asserted an affirmative defense of "This 
Petition should be dismissed, as it is a successive petition, I.C. § 19-4908." (R., p.13.) 
In addition, the state filed a Motion for Summary Dismissal in which the state asserted 
that the petition should be dismissed as "the successive petition is barred" and that 
there were no material issues of fact in the case. (R., p.24.) The State attached a copy 
of the transcript of Mr. Buss's change of plea hearing to this motion. (R., p.24.) 
Specifically, the state asserted that the alleged successive petition should be 
dismissed because, "petitioner having failed to make any allegation of any 
ineffectiveness of post-conviction counsel, the current petition should be summarily 
dismissed." (R., p.24.) In regards to the merits of Mr. Buss's petition, the State 
asserted that the Change of Plea transcript established that Mr. Buss's guilty plea was 
made knowingly and voluntarily, and that Mr. Buss was adequately informed of the 
' Contemporaneously with filing this brief, Mr. Buss has filed a motion asking this Court to take judicial 
notice of the Notice of Appeal and Remittitur in Supreme Court docket number 30499. 
4 
consequences of his plea prior to its entry. (R., p.24.) In addition, the State asserted 
that, "a good faith assurance of leniency or a mere prediction by a defense counsel to a 
defendant of the sentence anticipated is no grounds for post conviction relief although 
the sentence imposed is greater than predicted." (R., p.25 (citing Walker v. State, 92 
ldaho 517,520,446 P.2d 886, 889 (1968).) 
At the hearing on the State's motion, counsel for the State reiterated that the 
petition should be dismissed as an improper successive petition, and that there was no 
genuine issue of material fact as to whether the plea was knowingly and intelligently 
made. (Tr., p.4, L.14 - p.6, L.4.) Thereafter the district court questioned how the plea 
could be knowing or voluntary if Mr. Buss had been incorrectly informed as to whether 
ldaho recognized either self defense or justifiable homicide. (Tr., p.6, Ls.5-12.) 
Counsel for the State relied upon the fact that trial counsel "would never have said that." 
(Tr., p.6, Ls.13-22.) In addition, counsel asserted that the facts articulated in the 
change of plea transcript and the Alford plea itself "might circumvent any issue with 
regard to self-defense." (Tr., p.6, L.23 - p.7, L.7.) 
In addition to discussing the self defense issue, the court informed counsel for 
the State that there were other issues raised in the petition, "allegations concerning 
coercion, whether or not he was able to review witness statements, use of drugs, and 
the fact that he didn't have sufficient time to contact his family to discuss the plea." (Tr., 
p.7, L.24 - p. 8, L.2.) Recognizing that the State hadn't yet addressed these claims, the 
court asked the State, "Have you looked at any specific authority relating to any of those 
allegations?" (Tr., p.8, Ls.3.) Counsel for the State conceded that he hadn't, but noted 
a case which addressed instances where "allegations can be negated by the transcript 
of the sentencing hearing or ... the change of plea hearing." (Tr., p.8, Ls.8-10.) Counsel 
also conceded that, "The only allegation that is not specifically and directly negated is 
the one that the Court has concern, and that is with regard to the self-defense issue." 
(Tr., p.8, Ls.21-24.) 
When addressing the State's successive petition claim, counsel for Mr. Buss 
informed the court that Mr. Buss's petition was not a successive petition, but rather the 
"replacement of one by the other, particularly where the earlier petition was not 
dismissed with prejudice." (Tr., p.9, Ls.7-11.) Counsel also noted that, "it certainly 
doesn't mean that Mr. Buss has had his initial petition fully litigated to the satisfaction of 
his due process rights or the rights under the statute." (Tr., p.11, Ls.3-6.) The district 
court questioned whether the prior dismissal was with, or without, prejudice, and 
recognized that I.C. 19-4908 stated that, "Any ground finally adjudicated may not be a 
basis for a subsequent application." (Tr., p.1 I ,  L.18 - p.12, L.20.) 
In regards to the self-defense claim, counsel for Mr. Buss asserted that "in a 
motion for summary dismissal, the Court has to construe the facts in the light most 
favorable to" Mr. Buss. (Tr., p.14, Ls.21-24.) Counsel also recognized that, "ultimately 
what Mr. Buss will have to prove, that ... he wasn't advised and that he had a legitimate 
claim for self-defense in order for a postconviction [sic] relief inadequate, you know, 
representation." (Tr., p.15, Ls.20-25.) The district court questioned this asking, 
"Doesn't he have to do that at this hearing, also?" (Tr., p.16, Ls.1-2.) Counsel admitted 
that Mr. Buss hadn't "fully notif[ied] that these are the reasons that I believe self-defense 
was available to him." (Tr., p.16, Ls.20-23.) The district court found this of concern. 
(Tr., p.16, L.24.) 
Turning to the other issues raised in Mr. Buss's petition, his counsel conceded 
that they were not supported by the transcript, and appeared to waive all claims with the 
exception of the self-defense claim. (Tr., p.17, Ls.10-21.) 
In rebuttal, counsel for the State relied solely on Mr. Buss's petition to assert that 
"Mr. Buss, fails to set forth any facts whatsoever that would establish that self-defense 
would even apply to his situation." (Tr., p.19, Ls.6-9.) As a result, counsel claimed that 
the petition was inadequate as any error by trial counsel would not have been of 
"material value." (Tr., p.19, Ls.17-19.) 
Merely one day after the hearing on the State's motion for summary judgment, 
the district court summarily dismissed Mr. Buss's petition, articulating its reasoning in its 
Memorandum Decision Re: Motion for Summary Dismissal. (R., pp.28-45.) As to the 
successive nature of the petition, the district court found that, "Buss's motion to 
withdraw his petition and failure to object to the dismissal ordered by this court 
constitutes a knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver of Buss's the [sic] claims raised 
by Buss in his June 20, 2005, petition for post conviction relief." (R., p.32.) Further, the 
court found that, because the same issues as were raised in that petition were also 
raised in this case, the current petition was barred by I.C. $j 19-4908. (R., p.32.) 
In addition, applying the doctrine of issue preclusion, the district court determined 
that the dismissal of the initial filing was a "final judgment and precludes the issues 
raised in that petition from being raised in a subsequent petition." (R., pp.32-33.) In so 
holding, the court reasoned: 
At the hearing on the motion for summary dismissal of Buss's June 20, 
2005, petition, both parties were allowed to fully argue their positions. 
After arguing his position, Buss requested that he be allowed to withdraw 
his petition. The Court deemed the request as a motion to dismiss, which 
the Court granted. That decision had a conclusive effect and was subject 
to appeal. Buss had ample opportunity to appeal that decision, but did 
not. 
(R., p.33.) 
In regards to Mr. Buss's claim regarding the existence of self defense in Idaho, 
the district court found that: 
Buss has not provided any facts that support an argument for self defense 
or justifiable homicide. As a petitioner opposing summary dismissal under 
§ 19-4906, Buss is required to present evidence to support every 
controverted element of his claim for relief. Mata v. State, 124 ldaho 588, 
592, 861 P.2d 1253, 1257 (Ct. App. 1993). Without any facts supporting 
self defense or justifiable homicide, Buss has not proved that he was 
prejudiced by trial counsel's alleged advice (i.e., that he would not have 
pled guilty). 
(R., p.37.) 
Mr. Buss timely appealed from the district court's order summarily dismissing his 
petition for post-conviction relief. (R., pp.1, 45-46, 50.) 
ISSUES 
1. Did the district court err when it dismissed Mr. Buss's petition for post- 
conviction relief where the district court determined that the petition was 
barred by I.C. $ 19-4908, but erroneously determined that Mr. Buss had 
previously knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived the issues 
raised? 
2. Did the district court err when it dismissed, sua sponte, and without prior 
notice, Mr. Buss's post-conviction petition based upon the doctrine of 
issue preclusion despite the fact that the prior adjudication relied upon by 
the district court was not a final determination of the merits of Mr. Buss's 
petition, and was not an appealable order? 
3. Did the district court err when it dismissed Mr. Buss's claim that his plea 
was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered in light of his 
attornev's affirmative misreoresentation of the availabilitv of the affirmative 
defenses of self-defense oijustifiable homicide in ldaho? 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Dismissed Mr. Buss's December 2005 Petition For 
Post-Conviction Relief Because Mr. Buss Had Not Knowinqlv, lntellinentlv Or Voluntarily 
Waived Anv Issues Raised In The June 2005 Petition 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Buss asserts that the district court erred in finding that Idaho Code section 
19-4908 barred consideration of the December 2005 petition because Mr. Buss had 
knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived all claims listed in his June 20, 2005, 
petition. This is true because it is clear from the audio recording of the hearing in which 
Mr. Buss moved to dismiss the action that he sought to dismiss the June 2005 petition 
without prejudice, the district court granted the motion made, and the district court never 
indicated that it was dismissing the petition with prejudice. Thus, the claims in the June 
2005 petition were not waived at all, but rather reserved for subsequent adjudication. 
Further, even assuming Arguendo that the issues were somehow waived, it is 
clear from the audio recording of the October 27, 2005, hearing that Mr. Buss's 
dismissal of the claims in the June 2005, petition were premised upon erroneous legal 
advice and post-conviction counsel's misunderstanding of the applicable law. Thus, any 
waiver that did occur was neither knowing, intelligent, nor voluntary. 
Because the district court erred in finding that Mr. Buss knowingly, voluntarily, 
and intelligently waived the claims articulated in his June 20, 2005, petition, the court 
also erred in dismissing Mr. Buss's December 12, 2005, petition on the grounds that the 
petition was barred by I.C. § 19-4908. 
B. Mr. Buss Did Not Waive The Claims From The June 2005, Petition Because The 
Audio Recordinq Of The October 27, 2005. Hearing Establishes That Mr. Buss 
Souaht To Dismiss That Action Without Preiudice, The District Court Granted 
The Motion Made. And The District Court Never Indicated That It Was Dismissinq 
The Petition With Preiudice 
In dismissing the December 2005, petition for post-conviction relief, the district 
court found that, I.C. § 19-4908 barred consideration of that petition because, "Buss's 
motion to withdraw his petition and failure to object to the dismissal ordered by this court 
constitutes a knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver of Buss's the [sic] claims raised 
by Buss in his June 20, 2005, petition for post conviction relief." (R., p.32.) However, 
because the motion made by Mr. Buss was for a dismissal without prejudice and the 
court granted the motion made, Mr. Buss did not knowingly or intelligently waive any 
claims raised in the June 2005 petition. 
During the October 27, 2005, hearing, when counsel moved to withdraw 
Mr. Buss's June 2005 petition, counsel informed the court that Mr. Buss was doing so, 
"so he might reconsider and decide if he wants to file it again under new issues or just 
try a different tack." (A.R.) Thus, it was clear from counsel's request that Mr. Buss was 
seeking a dismissal without prejudice so that he could reconsider the proper way to 
proceed with his claims, which may include refilling the petition. Importantly, when the 
district court ultimately dismissed the June 2005, petition, the court stated it was 
granting Mr. Buss's motion, and did not state that the dismissal was with prejudice. 
(A.R.) 
In moving to dismiss his June 2005 petition without prejudice, Mr. Buss was not 
knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily waiving any issues in that petition because a 
dismissal without prejudice does not waive the issues raised. When a post-conviction 
petition is dismissed without prejudice, it does not have a "conclusive effect," but rather 
preserves the interests of the applicant in subsequently raising that issue. In Parsons v. 
State, 113 ldaho 421, 745 P.2d 300 (Ct. App. 1987), the Court recognized that when a 
post-conviction proceeding is filed while a direct appeal is pending, "the application may 
be either dismissed without prejudice or suspended until the appeal is resolved." Id. at 
426, 745 P.2d at 305. The court also recognized that this would "preserve the interests 
of the applicant ...." Id. In other words, the dismissal without prejudice would result in 
the ability of the petitioner to subsequently raise the post-conviction issues, if 
necessary, following the completion of the direct appeal. See also Tucker v. State, 97 
ldaho 4, 14, 539 P.2d 556, 566 (1975) (ordering petition of post-conviction relief 
dismissed without prejudice because a final judgment of conviction had not yet been 
entered). In fact, when "a suit is dismissed 'without prejudice,' it is meant as a 
declaration that no rights or privileges of the party concerned are to be considered as 
thereby waived or lost ...." and "A dismissal 'without prejudice' allows a new suit to be 
brought on the same cause of action." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1603 (6'h Edition 1990); 
see also Cooter & Gel1 v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 396 (1990) (noting "'Dismissal 
... without prejudice' is a dismissal that does not 'operat[e] as an adjudication upon the 
merits,' Rule 41(a)(l), and thus does not have a res judicata effect.") 
Because it is clear from the audio recording of the October 27, 2005, hearing that 
Mr. Buss moved to dismiss the June 2005 petition without prejudice, and the district 
court granted the motion made, but never indicated that it was dismissing the petition 
with prejudice, the district court erred when it determined that Mr. Buss had knowingly, 
intelligently and voluntarily waived the claims raised in the June 2005 petition. Thus, 
the district court erred when it found that the December 2005 petition was barred on this 
ground by I.C. 3 19-4908. 
C .  Any Waiver Of Claims That May Have Been Made By Mr. Buss Was Neither 
lntelliqent Nor Voluntaw As The Audio Recording Of The October 27, 2005, 
Hearing Conclusively Establishes That Any Such Waiver Was The Result Of 
Mr. Buss Receivina Clearly Erroneous Legal Advice 
Assuming Arguendo, that this Court were to find that a waiver was made by 
Mr. Buss's dismissal of his June 2005 petition, any such waiver was not knowing and 
voluntary as it was not an active, knowing choice, but rather was premised upon 
incorrect legal advice given by post-conviction counsel. Therefore, any waiver made 
was not a knowing, intelligent, nor voluntary waiver of the claims in the June 2005 
petition. 
1. In Moving To Withdraw The June 20. 2005, Petition, Post-Conviction 
Counsel Relied Upon A Material Misunderstanding Of The Law 
"I did discuss his petition and the fact that many of the allegations he's alleged 
have to do with what Mr. Allison said or didn't do, and with his recent passing it would 
be hard to prove any of those allegations." (A.R.) In subsequently arguing the merits of 
Mr. Buss's June 2005 petition, counsel noted that Mr. Buss had alleged that Mr. Allison 
had informed him that, "there is no self-defense or justifiable homicide in Idaho. Again, 
there is no way to prove or disprove that Mr. Allison told him there was no such 
defense ... with Mr. Allison's passing, there is no way to verify that Mr. Buss was ever 
told that." (A.R.) 
It is clear from counsel's statements at the time Mr. Buss's motion to withdraw his 
petition was made that counsel for Mr. Buss was under the impression that Mr. Buss 
could not prove what he was told by Mr. Allison. However, this is simply incorrect. 
In a post-conviction action, 'The court may receive proof by affidavits, 
depositions, oral testimony, or other evidence and may order the applicant brought 
before it for the hearing." I.C. § 19-4907. Prior to the hearing in which counsel for 
Mr. Buss moved to withdraw the petition, Mr. Buss had already offered evidence as to 
what his trial counsel told him prior to the entry of the plea. In the verified petition 
Mr. Buss stated that "I was told there was no self defense or justifiable homicide in 
Idaho. I've read the law and know there is now." (Petition filed June 20, 2005, p.3.) 
"Verification means attestation under oath as to the truth, etc. of the pleadings and is, 
perforce, a personal ceremony ...." Updegraff v. Adams, 66 ldaho 795, 799, 169 P. 2d 
501, 503 (1946). Accordingly, "[a] verified pleading that sets forth evidentiary facts 
within the personal knowledge of the verifying signator is in substance an affidavit, and 
is accorded the same probative force as an affidavit." Mata v. State, 124 ldaho 588, 
861 P.2d 1253 (Ct. App. 1993) (citation omitted). In addition, Mr. Buss stated in his 
affidavit attached to the petition that, "my attorney Brett Allison, lied to me telling me 
there was no law for self defense or justifiable homicide." (Petition filed June 20, 2005, 
Affidavit of Facts In Support of Post Conviction Petition, p.1.) 
It is apparent that Mr. Buss's post-conviction counsel was unaware that the 
record already before the district court was sufficient to prove what trial counsel told 
Mr. Buss prior to his entry of the guilty plea. Thus, in contrast to counsel's assertions to 
the district court, there was an obvious way to prove that Mr. Allison told Mr. Buss that 
ldaho did not recognize either self-defense or justifiable homicide. 
In addition, initial post-conviction counsel incorrectly believed that Mr. Buss had 
an obligation to "verify" what he was told by Mr. Allison. (A.R. ("with Mr. Allison's 
passing, there is no way to verify that Mr. Buss was ever told that.") This "presumes 
that an affidavit from an interested party is not sufficient without additional evidence. 
However, there is no requirement that an interested party corroborate [his] testimony, 
and a court does not err by considering an affidavit from an interested party without 
further corroboration." Schultz v. Schultz, 2008 Opinion No. 82 (June 13, 2008) (citing 
Wait V. Leave11 Cattle, Inc., 136 ldaho 792, 798, 41 P.3d 220, 226 (2001)). Thus, post- 
conviction counsel erred in believing that Mr. Buss had to verify or corroborate his own 
statements in his verified petition and affidavit. 
Finally, the district court questioned counsel for the State as to whether Idaho's 
dead man's statute would effect Mr. Buss's claims. In fact, it would not. "The dead 
man's statute does not apply where, as here, the action is not against the executor or 
administrator of an estate and the claim does not represent a demand against the 
estate." Rowan v. Riley, 139 ldaho 49, 54, 72 P.3d 889, 894 (2003) (citing I.C. 9-202 
and I.R.E. 601(b)). 
It is clear from counsel's statements at the October 27, 2005, hearing that 
counsel for Mr. Buss based the need for the dismissal of the petition on a 
misunderstanding of the law. It is equally clear that his advice to Mr. Buss, specifically 
to dismiss the petition, was premised upon this misunderstanding. As a result, Mr. Buss 
did not knowingly, intelligently or voluntarily waive the issues in the June 2005 petition. 
Rather, the dismissal was based upon his post-conviction attorneys ill-founded advice. 
The ldaho Supreme Court has recognized that the ineffective assistance of post- 
conviction counsel can result in an insufficient waiver of a post-conviction issue. See 
Palmer v. State, 102 ldaho 591, 635 P.23d 955 (1981). In Palmer, the ldaho Supreme 
Court recognized: 
allegations of ineffective assistance of prior post-conviction counsel, if 
true, would warrant a finding that the omission in the prior post-conviction 
proceeding of the allegations now being raised anew by [the petitioner] 
was not a result of an active, knowing choice made by [the petitioner] 
through his prior court-appointed attorney, and would therefore provide 
sufficient reason for permitting the newly asserted allegations to be raised 
in the instant [successive] petition. 
Because any waiver of issues made by Mr. Buss in voluntarily dismissing his 
June 2005 petition were the result of his attorney's misunderstanding of the law, they 
were not the result of an active, knowing choice. Rather, they were a choice borne out 
of ignorance premised upon the ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel. As a 
result, the record on appeal establishes that Mr. Buss asserted grounds for relief which, 
for sufficient reason, was inadequately raised in the June 2005 petition, justifying the 
December 2005 petition, even under the strict standards of ldaho Code § 19-4908. 
2. Mr. Buss Was Willina To Withdraw The June 2005 Petition Based Upon 
His Attorney's Belief That Mr. Buss Could Refile A Petition. If That Was 
Incorrect, Anv Waiver Of The Claims Could Not Be A Knowina And 
Voluntaw Waiver 
Assuming Arguendo, that Mr. Buss did waive the claims in his June 2005 petition 
by seeking to withdraw that petition without prejudice, any such waiver could not be 
knowing or voluntary as it was specifically premised upon counsel's representation that 
Mr. Buss would be able to refile his post-conviction petition. 
During the October 27, 2005, hearing, Mr. Buss's counsel informed the court that 
Mr. Buss was seeking to withdraw the petition "so he might reconsider and decide if he 
wants to file it again under new issues or just try a different tack." (A.R.) Thus, it was 
clear from counsel's statements that, although Mr. Buss was willing to withdraw the 
June 2005 petition, Mr. Buss agreed to do so premised upon his post-conviction 
counsel's understanding that Mr. Buss could reconsider the best way to bring his 
claims, including refilling a post-conviction petition. Thus, any waiver of the claims in 
the June 2005 petition were not borne from an active and knowing choice, but rather 
were done without knowledge that the claims would be subsequently precluded as 
waived. Because any waiver of issues made by Mr. Buss in voluntarily dismissing his 
June 2005 petition were the result of his belief, based upon a discussion with his post- 
conviction attorney, that the issues were not, in fact, waived, the waiver cannot be a 
knowing, intelligent, or voluntary waiver. As a result, the record on appeal establishes 
that Mr. Buss asserted grounds for relief which for sufficient reason was inadequately 
raised in the June 2005 petition, justifying the December 2005 petition, even under the 
strict standards of Idaho Code ?j 19-4908. 
II. 
The District Court Erred When It Found That The Issues Raised In Mr. Buss's Post- 
Conviction Action Were Barred BV The Doctrine Of lssue Preclusion 
A. Introduction 
Despite the fact that the district court dismissed Mr. Buss's petition for post- 
conviction relief on the grounds that the issues raised in the petition were barred from 
consideration by the doctrine of issue preclusion, a ground not raised in the State's 
Motion for Summary Dismissal, the district court did not follow the procedures 
articulated in I.C. 5 19-04906(b). In addition, in holding that the issues were barred by 
issue preclusion, the district court made, and relied upon, erroneous legal conclusions, 
as well as clearly erroneous factual findings. As a result of these errors, the district 
court's conclusion that the doctrine of issue preclusion barred consideration of the 
issues in the December 2005 petition is incorrect. For each of these reasons, the 
court's order summarily dismissing Mr. Buss's petition should be vacated, the case 
remanded to the district court. 
B. The District Court Erred When It Found That The Issues Raised In Mr. Buss's 
Post-Conviction Action Were Barred By The Doctrine Of lssue Preclusion 
The district court dismissed Mr. Buss's post-conviction petition, in part, based 
upon it's determination that the dismissal of Mr. Buss's June 20, 2005, petition was a 
"final judgment and precludes the issues raised in that petition from being raised in a 
subsequent petition." (R., pp.32-33.) In so holding, the court reasoned: 
At the hearing on the motion for summary dismissal of Buss's June 20, 
2005, petition, both parties were allowed to fully argue their positions. 
After arguing his position, Buss requested that he be allowed to withdraw 
his petition. The Court deemed the request as a motion to dismiss, which 
the Court granted. That decision had a conclusive effect and was subject 
to appeal. Buss had ample opportunity to appeal that decision, but did 
not. 
(R., p.33.) 
Initially, Mr. Buss asserts that the district court erred in dismissing his petition on 
this ground, as the court failed to follow the procedures articulated in I.C. § 19-04906(b) 
despite the fact that it dismissed the petition on a ground not raised in the State's 
Motion for Summary Dismissal. In addition, Mr. Buss asserts that, in holding that the 
issues were barred by issue preclusion, the district court made, and relied upon, 
erroneous legal conclusions, as well as clearly erroneous factual findings. Finally, the 
district court misapplied the analysis for issue preclusion. 
1. The District Court Erred In Dismissins Mr. Buss's Petition On This Ground, 
As The Court Failed To Follow The Procedures For Sua Sponte Dismissal 
As Articulated In I.C. 6 19-4906(b) 
a. Where The State Has Filed A Motion For Summarv Disposition. But 
The Court Dismisses The Application On Grounds Different From 
Those Asserted In The State's Motion, It Does So On Its Own 
Initiative And The Court Must Follow The Procedures Outlined In 
ldaho Code Section 19-4906(b) 
"Motions for summary disposition pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906 are procedurally 
equivalent to motions for summary judgment under I.R.C.P. 56(e) ...." Martinez v. 
State, 126 ldaho 813, 817, 892 P.2d 488, 492 (Ct. App. 1995) (citation omitted). In 
summary judgment proceedings, "if the movant does not challenge an aspect of the 
nonmovant's case in that party's motion, the nonmovant is not required to address it at 
the summary judgment stage of the proceedings." Thomson v. ldaho Insurance 
Agency, Inc., 126 ldaho 527, 531, 887 P.2d 1034, 1038 (1994). This means that, "the 
party responding to a summary judgment motion is not required to present evidence on 
every element of his or her case at that time, but rather must establish a genuine issue 
of material fact regarding the element or elements challenged by the moving party's 
motion." Id. at 530, 887 P.2d at 1037. This is because "when a party moves for 
summary judgment, the initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of 
material fact rests with that party." Id. Therefore, "if the moving party fails to challenge 
an element of the nonmovant's case, the initial burden placed on the moving party has 
not been met and therefore does not shift to the nonmovant." Id. 
Similar principles apply in post-conviction proceedings, though for a different 
reason. See Martinez, 126 ldaho at 817-18, 892 P.2d 492-93 (applying Thomson in 
post-conviction case). Unlike a typical civil complaint, a petition for post-conviction 
relief must be verified with respect to facts within the personal knowledge of the 
applicant, and affidavits, records or other evidence supporting its allegations must be 
attached, or the application must state why such supporting evidence is not included 
with the application. I.C. 3 19-4903. Thus, the initial burden of establishing a material 
issue of fact, appears to rest not with the summary dismissal movant, but rather with the 
petitioner. 
However, in a post-conviction action, the party moving for summary dismissal 
must still challenge specific aspects of the nonmoving party's case. ldaho Code § 19- 
4906(c), which addresses motions for summary dismissal in post-conviction actions, 
provides as follows: 
The court may grant a motion by either party for summary disposition of 
the application when it appears from the pleadings, depositions, answers 
to interrogatories, and admissions and agreements of fact, together with 
any affidavits submitted, that there is no genuine issue of material fact and 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Id. Further, because an application for post-conviction relief is a civil proceeding, the 
ldaho Rules of Civil Procedure apply. Saykhamchone v. State, 127 ldaho 319, 321, 900 
P.2d 795, 797 (1995) (citation omitted). Thus, a motion made by the State pursuant to 
I.C. § 19-4906(c), must comply with the requirements of I.R.C.P. 7(b)(l). Id. at 322, 900 
P.2d at 798. This rule requires that motions "shall state with particularity the grounds 
therefore . . . . ' I  R C P  7(b)(). In Saykhamchone the Court noted that at a minimum the 
State's request for summary dismissal must state "its grounds with particularity." 
Saykhamchone, T27 ldaho at 322,900 P.2d at 798. 
The importance of the State complying with I.R.C.P. 7(b)(l) can be found in the 
fact that, unlike in section 19-4906(b), there is no provision in section 19-4906(c) for the 
district court to provide notice of an intent to dismiss the petition. Compare I.C. 5 19- 
4906(b)&(c). Rather, "the motion itself serves as notice that summary dismissal is being 
sought." State v. Christensen, 102 ldaho 487, 488, 632 P.2d 676, 677 (1981). 
Thereafter, the petitioner has the "opportunity to present any evidence he desire[s] by 
affidavits to counter the state's motion, and the providing of such an opportunity is the 
precise reason for the twenty day notice requirement of paragraph (b)." Id. In addition, 
after the State files such a motion, "the like twenty day period of time shall be allowed 
as under paragraph (b)." Id. at 489, 632 p.2d at 678. 
Further, when a district court dismisses a post conviction petition on grounds not 
presented in a State's motion to dismiss, the petitioner "has no opportunity to convince 
the district court that he should prevail upon the merits." Gibbs v. State, 103 ldaho 758, 
760,653 P.2d 813,815 (Ct. App. 1982). For a petitioner to have a chance to argue the 
relevant points, it is necessary for the Court itself to comply with the notice 
requirements. Id. Thus, "'where the state has filed a motion for summary disposition, 
but the court dismisses the application on grounds different from those asserted in the 
state's motion, it does so on its own initiative and the court must provide twenty days 
notice." Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 524, 164 P.3d 798, 804 (2007) (quoting 
Gibbs, supra.) This is because dismissal upon the court's initiative is subject to the 
procedures outlined in $j 19-4906(b). Those being, 
(b) When a court is satisfied, on the basis of the application, the answer or 
motion, and the record, that the applicant is not entitled to post-conviction 
relief and no purpose would be served by any further proceedings, it may 
indicate to the parties its intention to dismiss the application and its 
reasons for so doing. The applicant shall be given an opportunity to reply 
within 20 days to the proposed dismissal. In light of the reply, or on default 
thereof, the court may order the application dismissed or grant leave to file 
an amended application or, direct that the proceedings otherwise 
continue. Disposition on the pleadings and record is not proper if there 
exists a material issue of fact. 
Id. 
b. The District Court Dismissed. Sua Sponte, Mr. Buss's Petition For 
Post-Conviction Relief On Grounds Not Raised By The State, But 
Failed To Provide Mr. Buss With Twentv Davs Notice Of Its Intent 
To Dismiss On Those Grounds 
In its Motion for Summary Dismissal, the State asserted as its initial grounds for 
summary dismissal that the petition was a successive petition which violated I.C. 5 19- 
4908. In total, the State claimed: 
Petitioner previously filed a petition in Bonneville County Case # 
CV-0503532 on essentially the same ground as the present petition. That 
petition was dismissed on 10/27/05 on the motion of the petitioner at the 
time of the hearing of the state's motion for summary dismissal. I.C. § 19- 
4908 states: 
All grounds for relief available to an applicant under this act 
must be raised in his original, supplemental or amended 
application. Any ground finally adjudicated or not so raised, 
or knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived in the 
proceeding that resulted in the conviction or sentence or in 
any other proceeding the applicant has taken to secure relief 
may not be the basis for a subsequent application, unless 
the court finds a ground for relief asserted which for 
sufficient reason was not asserted or was inadequately 
raised in the original, supplemental, or amended application. 
In Baker v. State of ldaho, 2005 WL 1243348 (Idaho App.), the 
ldaho Court of Appeals addresses the issue of a successive post- 
conviction petition, essentially stating that unless the applicant can 
demonstrate whether the alleged ineffective assistance of post-conviction 
counsel provided a sufficient reason to bring the successive application. 
See Baker, at pgs. 9 through 10, copy attached. Therefore, petitioner 
having failed to make any allegation of any ineffectiveness of post- 
conviction counsel, the current petition should be summarily dismissed. 
Therefore the successive petition is barred. 
(R., pp.23-24.) 
Despite the fact that the doctrine of issue preclusion was never mentioned by the 
State in the Motion For Summary Dismissal, the district court dismissed Mr. Buss's 
post-conviction petition, in part, based upon its own application of the doctrine of issue 
preclusion. (Compare R., pp.23-24 and p.32.) 
Because the State's claim was only that Mr. Buss's petition was a successive 
petition in violation of I.C. § 19-4908, the district court's dismissal of the petition upon 
the grounds of the application of the doctrine of issue preclusion was a dismissal sua 
sponte. However, the district court dismissed Mr. Buss's petition on these grounds 
under the guise of granting the State's Motion For Summary Dismissal, and did not 
follow the procedures articulated in I.C. § 19-4906(b), including providing Mr. Buss with 
notice of its intent to dismiss on these grounds. (See R. generally, and pp.32-33.) As a 
result, Mr. Buss had "no opportunity to convince the district court that he should prevail 
upon the merits." Gibbs, 103 ldaho at 760, 653 P.2d at 815. Because, the district court 
erred when it dismissed Mr. Buss's petition on grounds for which Mr. Buss was not 
given notice, the summary dismissal should be vacated and the case remanded to the 
district court for the issuance of appropriate notice prior to dismissal. 
2. In Holdina That Mr. Buss's Claims Were Barred Bv The Doctrine Of Issue 
Preclusion, The District Court Made, And Relied U~on ,  Clearlv Erroneous 
Factual Findings And Erroneous Legal Conclusions 
a. The District Court Made A Clearly Erroneous Findina That Mr. Buss 
Araued The Merits Of The Issues In The June 20. 2005 Petition 
Before Movinq To Withdraw The Petition 
The district court made a clearly erroneous factual finding when it found that 
during the October 27,2005, hearing "After arguing his position, Buss requested that he 
be allowed to withdraw his petition." (R., p.32.) In fact, counsel for Mr. Buss moved to 
withdraw the petition before arguing his positions on the State's motion for summary 
dismissal. (A.R.) In addition, counsel specifically requested that the district court first 
consider whether to grant the motion to withdraw the petition, and only adjudicate the 
merits of the State's motion "in the alternative, if the Court is not willing to do that." 
(A.R.) Thereafter, the district court reconfirmed, "Mr. Mallard, I consider your first 
request, I think you said you wanted to withdraw the petition, which was the language 
you used, I think that's equivalent to a motion to dismiss the petition. The motion's 
granted." (A.R. (emphasis added).) Thus, the district court's finding that it was only 
after counsel for Mr. Buss had argued his positions on the merits of the State's motion 
that the motion to withdraw the petition was made, is clearly erroneous. 
b. The District Court Reached A Clearlv Erroneous Legal Conclusion 
When It Determined That The Dismissal Of The June 20, 2005, 
Order Was Aopealable. And A Clearlv Erroneous Factual Finding 
When It Found That Mr. Buss Had An OpwortuniW To Appeal That 
Dismissal 
In addition, and more problematically, the district court made a clearly erroneous 
factual finding and reached an erroneous legal conclusion when it found that the prior 
dismissal "was subject to appeal. Buss had ample opportunity to appeal that decision, 
but did not." (R., p.33.) In fact, although the district court orally dismissed the pending 
petition during the October 27, 2005, hearing, the district court never entered a written 
order dismissing the petition. (See R. CV-05-3532 (not containing a written order 
dismissing the petition despite the fact that the order augmenting this record into the 
current record on appeal augmented with the "entire district court file in Bonneville 
County Case NO.CV-05-3532.").' 
The ldaho Appellate Rules provide: 
All appeals permitted or authorized by these rules, except as provided in 
Rule 12, shall be taken and made in the manner and within the time limits 
as follows: (a) Appeals From The District Court. Any appeal as a matter of 
right from the district court may be made only by physically filing a notice 
appeal with the clerk of the district court within 42 days from the date 
evidenced by the filing stamp of the clerk of the court on any judgment, 
order or decree of the district court appealable as a matter of right in any 
civil or criminal action." 
I.A.R. 14. Thus, an appeal can only be properly filed after the district court issues a 
written order bearing a "filing stamp." Id. Further, ldaho Appellate Rule 11 defines the 
appealable judgments and orders in a civil action. I.A.R. I l (a) .  That rule does not 
make oral rulings appealable. I.A.R. I l(a). Finally, an appeal filed after an oral 
It should also be noted that appellate counsel checked the ldaho Repository website on June 16, 2008, 
and the Register of Actions in CV-05-3532 does not contain an entry for a written order following the 
October 27, 2005. hearing. 
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pronouncement, but before a written order is entered is "premature," "defective," and 
does not vest jurisdiction in the appellate court. See I.A.R. 17(e)(2); Meridian Bowling 
Lanes v. Meridian Athletic Association, Inc., 105 ldaho 509, 51 1, 670 P.2d 1294, 1296 
(1983); State v, Gissel, 105 ldaho 287, 290,668 P.2d 1018, 1021 (Ct. App. 1983). 
Following the district court's verbal dismissal of the June 20, 2005, petition, the 
district court did not enter a written order. (See generally R. CV-05-3532.) Thus, there 
was no appealable order entered following the dismissal, and any Notice of Appeal filed 
would have been "premature," "defective," and would not have vested the ldaho 
Supreme Court with jurisdiction to hear the appeal. See I.A.R. I l(a), 14; Meridian 
Athletic Association, lnc., 105 ldaho at 511, 670 P.2d at 1296; Gissel, 105 ldaho at 
290, 668 P.2d at 1021. As a result, the district court's legal conclusion that the verbal 
order "was subject to appeal," is erroneous, and the factual finding that "Buss had 
ample opportunity to appeal that decision, but did not," was clearly erroneous. (R., 
p.33.) 
c. The District Court's Lesal Conclusion That The Verbal Dismissal Of 
The June 20, 2005, Petition "Had A Conclusive Effect," Was 
Erroneous 
The district court found that the verbal dismissal of the June 20, 2005, petition 
"had a conclusive effect ...." (See R., p.33.) Mr. Buss asserts that the district court's 
legal conclusion was in error as the district court ordered the prior dismissal, but did not 
specifically state that it was made with prejudice, which resulted in a dismissal without 
prejudice. 
Because the dismissal of the June 20, 2005, petition was ordered by the district 
court pursuant to ldaho Rule of Civil Procedure 41, and over the objection of the 
defendant, i.e. the State, it could only have been completed pursuant to ldaho Rule of 
Civil Procedure 41(a)(2). (A.R.) According to that rule, "unless otherwise specified in 
the order, a dismissal under this paragraph is without prejudice." I.A.R. 41(a)(2). In 
addition, "the purpose of this rule is to permit a plaintiff to dismiss an action without 
prejudice so long as the defendant will not be prejudiced." Jones v. Berezay, 120 ldaho 
332, 336, 815 P.2d 1072, 1076 (1991). Further, if an order of dismissal does not 
specify otherwise, the dismissal is without prejudice. Id. at 335, 815 P.2d at 1075. 
As was argued in section I(B), supra, which is incorporated herein by reference 
thereto, when a post-conviction petition is dismissed without prejudice, it does not have 
a "conclusive effect," but rather preserves the interests of the applicant in subsequently 
raising that issue. See Parsons, 113 ldaho at 426, 745 P.2d at 305; BLACK'S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1603 (6th Edition 1990) (stating that when "a suit is dismissed 'without 
prejudice,' it is meant as a declaration that no rights or privileges of the party concerned 
are to be considered as thereby waived or lost ...." and "A dismissal 'without prejudice' 
allows a new suit to be brought on the same cause of action.") 
Further, because the district court did not specifically state that the dismissal was 
with prejudice, and order of dismissal, even if it had been done in writing, was not 
"conclusive," as it was likely not even an appealable order under ldaho law. ldaho 
Appellate Rule l l ( a )  defines appealable orders in civil actions. The only possible 
subsection of that rule which could apply to an order dismissing an action pursuant to 
I.R.C.P. 41 is subsection (a)(l), which allows an appeal of "Judgments, orders and 
decrees which are final ...." A R  l l(a)( l) .  However, because the dismissal in the 
present case was done without prejudice, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 41(a)(2), the order is 
likely not a final one as it is not a final determination of the merits of the claims. Cf. 
Dannenberg v. Software Toolworks, Inc., 16 F.3d 1073 (gth Cir. 1994) (refusing to find 
appellate jurisdiction where claims were dismissed pursuant to a stipulation, and without 
prejudice to subsequently pursue them should the appellant prevail on other issues on 
appeal, because the stipulation rendered the lower court's decision non-final). 
Because the district court did not specifically dismiss the June 20, 2005 petition 
with prejudice, the district court erred in holding that the verbal dismissal was 
"conclusive." 
d. As A Result Of The District Court's Legal And Factual Errors. The 
District Court Misapplied The Analvsis For Issue Preclusion 
A dismissal without prejudice usually does not result in issue preclusion. 
Rodriguez v. Department of Correction, 136 ldaho 90, 94, 29 P.3d 401, 405 (2001) 
(citing Easter ldaho Agric. Credit Ass'n v. Neibaur, 133 ldaho 402, 408, 987 P.2d 314, 
320 (1999)). However, "a final judgment 'includes any prior adjudication of an issue in 
another action that is determined to be sufficiently firm to be accorded conclusive 
effect."' Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments 9 13 (1982)). The factors to 
consider in determining whether a prior adjudication is sufficiently firm are: a. whether 
the prior decision was "avowedly tentative;" b. whether the parties were fully heard; 
c. whether the court supported its decision with a reasoned opinion; and d. whether the 
decision was subject to appeal. Id. 
Although the district court essentially applied this legal analysis in finding that the 
doctrine of issue preclusion barred consideration of the issues in Mr. Buss's December 
2005 petition, because the district court was applying incorrect facts and legal 
conclusions, the district court reached a faulty conclusion. 
The proper application of the facts to the legal standard show that the doctrine of 
issue preclusion does not apply to the issues raised in Mr. Buss's December 2005 
petition. As was noted above, the dismissal of the June 2005 petition was done without 
prejudice. Thus, the prior adjudication was not "sufficiently firm." Rather, it was not a 
final determination of the merits of the claims. In addition, because the district court's 
oral order was neither reduced to writing, nor a final determination of the merits of 
Mr. Buss's claims, there was no appealable order such that the decision was "subject to 
appeal." Finally, because the district court dismissed Mr. Buss's claims, and did not rule 
on the merits of the claims, the court's decision was not supported with a "reasoned 
opinion" on those claims. As a result of these infirmities, the district court's conclusion 
that the doctrine of issue preclusion barred consideration of the claims in Mr. Buss's 
December 2005 petition was erroneous, and the order summarily dismissing Mr. Buss's 
petition on these grounds should be vacated and the case remanded to the district court 
for further proceedings. 
The District Court Erred When It Dismissed Mr. Buss's Claim That His Plea Was Not 
Knowingly, Intelligently, And Voluntarily Entered In Light Of His Attorney's Affirmative 
Misrepresentation Of The Availability Of The Affirmative Defenses Of Self Defense Or 
Justifiable Homicide In Idaho 
A. Introduction 
The district court dismissed Mr. Buss's petition on grounds not asserted by the 
State in its motion for summary dismissal. Therefore, the district court was required to 
comply with the notice requirements of I.C. 3 19-4906(b). Because the district court 
dismissed Mr. Buss's claim that his plea was not knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily 
entered in light of his attorney's affirmative misrepresentation of the availability of the 
affirmative defenses of self-defense and justifiable homicide a mere day after notifying 
Mr. Buss's counsel of the allegation that the record lacked any evidence of prejudice, 
this Court should vacate the order dismissing Mr. Buss's petition, and remand this case 
to the district court for the issuance of proper notice, such that Mr. Buss has the 
opportunity to present any additional evidence he has to support his claim. 
B. The District Court Erred When It Dismissed Mr. Buss's Claim That His Plea Was 
Not Knowingly, Intelligently. And Voluntarily Entered In Linht Of His Attorney's 
Affirmative Misrepresentation Of The Availability Of The Affirmative Defenses Of 
Self Defense Or Justifiable Homicide In ldaho 
In his petition for post-conviction relief, Mr. Buss asserted that his attorney in the 
criminal action rendered ineffective assistance of counsel when he instructed Mr. Buss 
that "there was no self defense or justifiable homicide in ldaho. This is how I was 
coerced into a plea bargain." (R., p.5.) As a remedy, Mr. Buss sought to withdraw his 
plea, and go to trial on the original charge. (R., p.6.) 
In the State's Motion for Summary Dismissal, the State did not specifically 
address this claim, but did assert generally that there were no material issues of fact. 
(R., p.24.) "The record readily establishes that [the district court] explained to the 
petitioner the consequences of pleading guilty, and established that the Petitioner's 
guilty plea was made knowingly and voluntarily." (R., p.24.) In support of this 
argument, the State attached a copy of the referenced change of plea transcript and 
quoted the facts of Chouinard v. State, 127 ldaho 836, 907 P.2d 813 (Ct. App. 1995), 
though not any legal holding or analysis from the case. Thereafter, and in total, the 
State asserted: 
The record renders it abundantly clear that petitioner was advised 
of the consequences of pleading guilty before entering his plea. He 
cannot now meritoriously claim that he received ineffective assistance of 
counsel with regard to his guilty plea. Furthermore, even if his trial 
counsel failed to properly advise petitioner of the consequences of the 
guilty plea, petitioner cannot show actual prejudice since [the district court] 
advised him of the consequences thereby precluding any finding that the 
second prong of the two-prong Strickland test could be met. See infra. 
Furthermore, a good faith assurance of leniency or a mere 
prediction by a defense counsel to a defendant of the sentence anticipated 
is no grounds for post conviction relief although the sentence imposed is 
greater than predicted. Walker v. State, 92 Idaho 517, 520, 446 P.2d 886, 
889 (1968). 
Therefore, no genuine issue of material fact exists and the State is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
(R., pp.24-25.) 
In sum, the State's Motion for Summary Dismissal argued that Mr. Buss's plea of 
guilty was knowingly and voluntarily entered because Mr. Buss knew the consequences 
of pleading guilty. However, the State's motion did not address, in any way, Mr. Buss's 
assertion that he didn't know he had options other than the guilty plea, i.e, a self 
defense claim or a justifiable homicide claim. See Norfb Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 
31 (1970) (holding that the standard for a valid guilty plea "was and remains whether the 
plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of 
action open to the defendant."); see also Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-43 
(1969) (recognizing that a plea may be involuntary when based upon "ignorance, 
incomprehension, coercion, terror, inducements, subtle or blatant threats ... ."). 
At the hearing on the State's motion, and in regards to the merits of Mr. Buss's 
claims, counsel for the state initially simply asserted: 
With regard to the second prong, that is that there is no genuine issue of 
material fact raised, simply ... the petitioner entered a knowing and 
intelligent guilty plea made under Alford, of course in the underlying case. 
And the record substantiates that the plea was entered knowingly and 
voluntarily. And, therefore, there is no basis for his allegations insofar as 
the substantive aspects of the matter are concerned. 
(Tr., p.5, L.21 - p.6, L.4.) Following this argument, the district court proceeded to 
pointedly question the prosecutor about how the plea could have been knowingly and 
voluntarily entered if Mr. Buss had been told that there was no defense of self defense 
or justifiable homicide in Idaho. (Tr., p.6, Ls.5-12.) In response, the prosecutor 
asserted that, Mr. Buss' trial counsel "would never have said that." (Tr., p.6, Ls.13-22.) 
He also reasserted his claim that the facts articulated in the change of plea hearing 
transcript, and the fact that "it was agreed by all that the defendant could be convicted if 
the matter was presented to a jury," "might circumvent any issue with regard to self- 
defense." (Tr., p.6, L.23 - p.7, L.7.) However, counsel for the State also conceded that, 
"The only allegation that is not specifically and directly negated is the one that the Court 
has concern, and that is with regard to the self-defense issue." (Tr., p.8, Ls.21-24.) 
In response to the State's motion for summary dismissal, counsel for Mr. Buss 
fist addressed the State's claim regarding the successive nature of Mr. Buss's petition. 
(Tr., p.9, L.7 - p.13, L. l l .)  Counsel then addressed the State's claim that the change of 
plea hearing transcript contradicted Mr. Buss's claims. (Tr., p.13, Ls.12-21.) 
Thereafter, the district court expanded the grounds for the State's motion for 
summary dismissal finding, "Well, I think, and [the prosecutor] may not have used that 
language, but I construed that to be the substance of his argument, that there are no 
facts supporting the self-defense claim." (Tr., p.13, Ls.22-25.) Counsel for Mr. Buss 
pointed out to the district court that: 
In a motion for summary dismissal, the Court has to construe the facts in 
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. So Mr. Buss has raised 
the issue that he didn't believe he was fully advised and so ... it's going to 
be up to you how you construe the facts raised in the Alford plea, Your 
Honor, whether or not you believe that Mr. Buss' claims can withstand, 
viewed in the light most favorable to him, whether he should have a full 
trial on these facts rather than a summary dismissal. 
I agree. We have the burden of proof in proving he was advised 
ultimately in a trial of facts. But in a motion for summary dismissal, I think 
the burden is the State's to say, under these facts, we believe that 
Mr. Buss' claims can't survive even that scrutiny. 
(Tr., p.14, L.21 - p.15, L.12.) Counsel also recognized that, "I agree that is ultimately 
what Mr. Buss will have to prove, that first ... he wasn't advised and that he had a 
legitimate claim for self-defense in order for a postconviction relief inadequate, you 
know, representation." (Tr., p.15, Ls.18-25.) The district court questioned this asking, 
"Doesn't he have to do that at this hearing, also?" (Tr., p.16, Ls.1-2.) Counsel admitted 
that Mr. Buss hadn't "fully notif[ied] that these are the reasons that I believe self-defense 
was available to him." (Tr., p.16, Ls.20-23.) The district court found this of concern. 
(Tr., p.16, L.24.) 
Turning to the other issues raised in Mr. Buss's petition, his counsel conceded 
that the change of plea transcript didn't support Mr. Buss's claims, and agreed with the 
prosecutor that "the other ones are pretty covered by the transcript.. . ." (Tr., p. 17, Ls. I O- 
23.) 
In rebuttal, counsel for the State relied solely on Mr. Buss's petition to assert, for 
the first time, that "Mr. Buss, fails to set forth any facts whatsoever that would establish 
that self-defense would even apply to his situation." (Tr., p.19, Ls.6-9.) The State also 
now claimed that, as a result, the petition was inadequate as any error by trial counsel 
would not have been of "material value." (Tr., p.19, Ls.17-19.) 
Merely one day after the hearing on the State's motion for summary judgment, 
the district court summarily dismissed Mr. Buss's petition, articulating its reasoning in its 
Memorandum Decision Re: Motion for Summary Dismissal. (R.,pp.28-45.) Under the 
guise of granting the State's motion for summary dismissal, the district court dismissed 
Mr. Buss's claim finding that: 
Buss has not provided any facts that support an argument for self defense 
or justifiable homicide. As a petitioner opposing summary dismissal under 
§ 19-4906, Buss is required to present evidence to support every 
controverted element of his claim for relief. Mata v. State, 124 ldaho 588, 
592, 861 P.2d 1253, 1257 (Ct. App. 1993). Without any facts supporting 
self defense or justifiable homicide, Buss has not proved that he was 
prejudiced by trial counsel's alleged advice (i.e., that he would not have 
pled guilty). 
(R., p.37.) 
Mr. Buss asserts that the district court erred in summarily dismissing his claim 
that his plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered because trial counsel in the 
underlying criminal action rendered ineffective assistance when he improperly informed 
Mr. Buss that ldaho law did not recognize the defenses of self-defense or justifiable 
homicide. The district court erred when it sua sponte dismissed this claim for lack of 
evidence without following the procedures outlined in I.C. 3 19-4906(b), including 
providing Mr. Buss with twenty days notice of the alleged defect in his petition. 
As was more fully argued in section II(B)(l)(a), supra, which is incorporated 
herein by reference thereto, "'where the state has filed a motion for summary 
disposition, but the court dismisses the application on grounds different from those 
asserted in the state's motion, it does so on its own initiative and the court must provide 
twenty days notice." Workman v. State, 144 ldaho 518, 524, 164 P.3d 798, 804 (2007) 
(quoting Gibbs, supra.) 
In the case at bar, the State sought summary dismissal upon the ground that the 
change of plea transcript contradicted Mr. Buss's claims, but subsequently conceded 
that this was not true of Mr. Buss's claim regarding his attorneys erroneous advice on 
the defense of self defense. (See R., pp.24-25, Tr., p.8, Ls.21-24.) In contrast, the 
district court expanded what the State had actually asserted. "Well, I think, and [the 
prosecutor] may not have used that language, but I construed that to be the substance 
of his argument, that there are no facts supporting the self-defense claim." (Tr., p.13, 
Ls.22-25.) Simply put, an assertion that a claim is precluded because it is contradicted 
by a record which shows Mr. Buss understood the consequences of pleading guilty is 
not the same as an assertion that the record contains no evidence to support a claim 
that Mr. Buss was ignorant of alternative courses of action open to him. While one 
questions whether he was aware what would happen after he pled guilty, the other 
questions whether he knew what he could do instead of pleading guilty. While one 
questions whether he understood the possible penalties he was facing, the other 
questions whether he was adequately informed whether he should be subject to a 
penalty at all. Thus, the district court dismissed Mr. Buss's petition on grounds other 
than that asserted by the State. 
In addition, the district court did not give Mr. Buss twenty day's notice prior to 
dismissing the petition on the grounds first discussed at the hearing on the State's 
motion for summary judgment. It was during the hearing that counsel for Mr. Buss was 
informed that the district court was construing the State's motion to allege insufficient 
evidence of prejudice. (See Tr., p.13, Ls.22-25.) It was also during this same hearing 
that the State specifically made this claim for the first time. (See Tr., p.19, Ls.2-19.) 
Nevertheless, the district court entered the order dismissing Mr. Buss's claims a mere 
day after the hearing. (Tr., p.4, Ls.1-2 (hearing held on April 6, 2006); R., p.45 (Order 
filed April 7, 2006).) As a result, Mr. Buss did not have the "opportunity to present any 
evidence he desire[s] by affidavits to counter the state's motion ...." Christensen, 102 
ldaho at 489,632 p.2d at 678. 
It should be noted that the record does contain some evidence to support 
Mr. Buss's allegation that he was prejudiced by his trial counsel's advice, i.e. that he 
would not have pled guilty in the absence of counsel's deficient performance. See Hill 
v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985) (finding that "in order to satisfy the 'prejudice' 
requirement, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to 
trial."). According to the facts put on the record in support of Mr. Buss's change of plea, 
the victim in the underlying criminal action approached Mr. Buss, believing that Mr. Buss 
owed him money. (Ch. Plea Tr., p.13, Ls.23-25.) When the argument ensued, "The 
victim raised his voice, and there were some statements made to the effect of, pay me 
the money or you'll have to shoot me. You'll have to shoot me." (Ch. Plea Tr., p.14, 
Ls.1-4.) The reasonable inference from these facts is that the victim in the underlying 
criminal action was the aggressor, and that Mr. Buss was threatened with the options of 
either paying the victim the money allegedly owed, or shooting the victim in order to 
avoid the negative consequences of not paying. See State v. Yakovac, 145 ldaho 437, 
180 P.3d 476 (2008) (holding that in ruling on a motion for summary dismissal in post- 
conviction actions a district court is "free to arrive at the most probable inferences to be 
drawn from uncontroverted evidentiary facts." Id. at 444, 180 P.3d at 483.) If the district 
court did not find this evidence sufficient to warrant an evidentiary hearing, the district 
court should have notified Mr. Buss of this fact so that he could supplement his petition 
with further facts to support his allegation that he, in fact, had a self-defense or 
justifiable homicide claim. 
Because the district court dismissed Mr. Buss's petition on grounds not asserted 
by the State in its motion for summary dismissal, the district court was required to 
comply with the notice requirements of I.C. § 19-4906(b). The district court, therefore, 
erred when it dismissed Mr. Buss's a mere day after notifying Mr. Buss's counsel of the 
allegation that the record lacked any evidence of prejudice. As a result, this court 
should vacate the order dismissing Mr. Buss's petition, and remand this case to the 
district court for the issuance of proper notice, such that Mr. Buss has the opportunity to 
present any additional evidence he has to support his claim 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the claims and argument above, Mr. Buss respectfully requests that 
this Court vacate the district court's order summarily dismissing his post-conviction 
action and remand this case to the district court for further proceedings. 
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